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RECENT DECISIONS
WILLS-LOST REVOKING INSTRUMENT-Oral testimony of a lost revok-
ing instrument is not admissible to defeat an existing valid will. A
revoking "other writing" must be executed and proved in the manner
required by the Wills Act.
Leonard Estate, 427 Pa. 363, 234 A.2d 856 (1967).
The decedent executed three wills during his life, the last being within
thirty days of his death. The first and third contained charitable dis-
positions, and were in existence at testator's death. The second, which
also contained charitable dispositions, had been revoked by its destruc-
tion. The statutory mandates of a charitable bequest under Wills Act of
19471 are: the gift shall be valid unless the will is executed within thirty
days of death and when executed within that period it shall be valid (1)
if all those who are to benefit by the gift's invalidity agree to its validity,
or (2) if the will executed within the thirty day period shall revoke
or supersede a prior will executed more than thirty days prior to death,
the original of which can be produced containing an "identical gift for
substantially the same religious or charitable purpose."2 Various chari-
table institutions successfully claimed that the dispositions in the first and
third will, which standing together met the second basis for validation
under the Wills Act. It was conceded that the gifts were identical and
for substantially the same purpose. The heirs at law, however, claimed
that the second (destroyed) will contained a clause revoking the first
will and that the first will did not thus serve as a prior will superseded
by the last will executed within thirty days of testator's death. If the
second will could be shown to contain such a revoking clause the chari-
table gifts would fail.' The issue thus presented to the Supreme Court of
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(1) (1947).
Death Within Thirty Days; Religious and Charitable Gifts. Any bequest or devise
for religious or charitable purpose included in a will or codicil executed within
thirty days of the death of the testator shall be invalid unless all who would
benefit by its invalidity agree that it shall be valid. The thirty day period shall be
so computed as to include the day on which the will or codicil is written and to
exclude the day of death. Unless the testator directs otherwise, if such a will or
codicil executed at least thirty days before testator's death and not theretofore
revoked or superseded and the original of which can be produced in legible condi-
tion, and the original shall contain an identical gift for substantially the same
religious or charitable purpose, the gift in the later will or codicil shall be valid;
or if each instrument shall give for substantially the same religious, or charitable
purpose a cash legacy or a share or the residuary estate or share of the same
asset, payable immediately or subject to identical prior estates and conditions the
later gift shall be valid to the extent to which it shall not exceed the prior gift.
2. Leonard Estate, 427 Pa. 364, 366, 234 A.2d 856, 858 (1967).
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Pennsylvania was whether the appellant heirs should be permitted to
prove, by oral testimony, that the second will contained a clause revoking
the first will.
Relying on Shetter's Estate4 and Koehler's Estate5 the court held:
"Oral testimony alone that the (first) will... was revoked by an alleged
(second) will ... is not sufficient to prove revocation and such evidence
is not admissible." 6 The policy of excluding such evidence is based upon
the fear that oral testimony would be so easy to procure as to reflect
seriously upon the stability of valid existing wills.' This policy is effectu-
ated by the requirement of some "other writing" signed and proved in ac-
cordance with the Wills Act. However, a series of cases dealing with
this problem indicates a somewhat less than full enforcement of the
policy when the evidence is secure of the "machinations of the designing
and corrupt."18 Thus, where the evidence to establish revocation is com-
posed of something more than mere oral testimony, i.e., documented
proof, it may be admissible due to the belief that a writing is more trust-
worthy than simple oral testimony.
In Shetter, testator executed a valid will with various charitable dis-
positions. A later second will, revoking the first, was itself revoked by
destruction. A codicil was then executed republishing the first will. The
validity of the execution of the codicil was questioned. The appellant con-
tended the first will was revoked by the second and that the codicil was
insufficient to reinstate the first will. Rejecting this argument the Supreme
Court stated: "It cannot be shown by oral testimony alone that a will has
been revoked. A writing declaring its revocation must be produced, signed
by the decedent, before an earlier will can be rendered nugatory" (empha-
sis added). 9 Because no "other writing" was produced declaring revoca-
tion, as required by the Wills Act of 1917, the first will was operative.
The exact weight of the Shetter precedent of itself is questionable for the
court also based the holding on the proposition that the first will was re-
instated by the codicil irrespective of the second will. Reaffirming Shetter's
Estate, Koehler's Estate held that a lost revoking will could not be
proven by oral testimony in order to defeat an existing valid will. This
3. Revocation in Pennsylvania is not ambulatory but is effective immediately upon the
execution of the later instrument. See P. BREoY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES ACT Or
1947, at 2357, and Burtt Will, 353 Pa. 217, 44 A.2d 670 (1945).
4. 303 Pa. 193, 154 A. 288 (1931).
5. 316 Pa. 321, 175 A. 424 (1934). See also P. BEEGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES
ACT oF 1947, at 2313, 8039, pointing out the questionable status of Koehler's Estate which
was reaffirmed in Leonard Estate.
6. Leonard Estate, 427 Pa. 363, 367, 234 A.2d 856, 858 (1967). This was a unanimous
decision written by Mr. Justice Jones.
7. Harrison's Estate, 316 Pa. 15, 20, 173 A. 407, 409 (1934).
8. Id.
9. 303 Pa. at 197, 154 A. at 289.
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case was not complicated by a republishing codicil as in Shetter; rather, it
was a direct holding proscribing oral testimony of revocation. The basis of
this holding was section 20 of the Wills Act of 1917. This section is simi-
lar to section 5 of the present Wills Act, in form and content, and did not
require the court in Leonard Estate to make and distinction between
them.' ° Both acts require some "other writing" declaring revocation,
executed and proved in the manner provided in the Wills Act.
A possible move away from the Shetter and Koehler position was
seen in Burtt Will" with the opinion written by Mr. Justice Stearne
with Justices Linn and Patterson dissenting. This controversy centered
on what requirements another writing had to meet in order to show rev-
ocation of a prior will. In Burtt testator had a prior, properly executed
will in existence and a subsequent will upon which he had obliterated his
signature. Although the question before the Supreme Court was one of
revival by cancellation of a later revoking will this question necessarily
presupposed that the will with the obliterated signature constituted some
"other writing." Holding that the second instrument constituted another
writing the court cited Ford's Estate2 as construing section 20 of the
10. Law of June 7, 1917, No. 190 (repealed 1947).
No will in writing, concerning any real estate, therein be altered, otherwise than
by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same,
executed or proved in the manner hereinbefore provided; or by burning, cancelling,
obliterating, or destroying the same by the testator himself, or by someone in
his presence and by his express direction. (b) No will in writing concerning any
personal estate shall be repealed, nor shall any bequest or direction therein be
altered, otherwise thus as hereinbefore provided in the case of real estate ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1947).
No will or codicil in writing or any part thereof can be revoked or altered otherwise
than:
(1) Will or codicil. By some other will or codicil in writing.
(2) Other Writing. By some other writing declaring the same, executed and proved
in the manner required of Wills, or,
(3) Act of the document. By being burnt, canceled, obliterated, or destroyed
with the intent and for the purpose of revocation, by the testator himself or by
another person in his presence and by his express direction. If such act is done by
any person other than the testator, the direction of the testator must be proved
by oaths or affirmations by two competent witnesses.
P. BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES AcT oF 1947, at 2352. "The present provision
enumerates substantially the same modes of revocation that have been in our statutes since
the Act of 1833, P.L. 249."
11. 353 Pa. 217, 44 A.2d 670 (1945).
12. 301 Pa. 183, J95, 151 A. 814 (1930). In Ford's Estate the last will of the testator
was partly torn by himself and the completion of the tearing was requested by another in
his presence and at his express direction. The court held: "The statute . . . opens the door
to 'other writings,' and does not say this 'other writing' may not be an effective will, so
long at it appears, as it does here, that the testator signed it." Dissenting, Mr. Chief Justice
Moschzisker, stated an "other writing" must possess the essential characteristics of a
testamentary document. A will which is torn up does not meet such a test.
[Vol. 6:392
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Wills Act of 1917 and held an unprobatable will, signed by the testator,
is "another writing" within the Act.13
Mr. Justice Linn, dissenting stated that Burtt was to be distinguished
from Ford in that in Ford there was a signed "other writing." Linn's
dissent stated that when the revoking instrument is not a will but some
"other writing" it still must be signed and proved in the manner required
by the Wills Act. 4 Continuing, Justice Linn stated: "The Court now
decides, as I understand it, that revocation may be shown by oral
evidence."' 5 Dissenting with Mr. Justice Linn, Mr. Justice Patterson
pointed out that destruction of a signature renders a will incapable of
being proved in the same manner as destruction of the entire instrument
renders it incapable of being proved.
In Forish's Will,'6 decided by the Orphans Court of Schuykill County,
the facts were similar to Burtt Will. In Forish the subsequent revoking
will could not be found at the death of the testator. The only evidence of
the executed subsequent will was a copy kept by the testator's attorney in
his files. In Burtt the original of the subsequent will was in existence with
the signature obliterated. The petitioner in Forish conceded the subse-
quent will which could not be found, raised the presumption of revocation
but he did allege that the copy constituted a revocation of the prior will
and thus that the decedent died intestate. Secretaries of the attorney
testified that the copy was exact, that the testator had signed it, and that
they had subscribed to the will. The court after quoting section 5 of the
1947 Wills Act stated the question to be whether the first will was re-
voked by some other will in writing." It was held that proof of revoca-
tion by a non-probatable will is admissible. The lower court in Leonard
Estate stated Forish did not follow the law of the Supreme Court."
13. 353 Pa. at 229, 44 A.2d at 672.
14. Id. at 233, 44 A.2d at 678.
15. Id. at 234, 44 A.2d at 678.
16. 40 D & C 2d 15 (1966).
17. Id. at 18. One may immediately take issue with this presentation of the question
for an unexecuted copy is not a will in writing. It would seem that if the revocation by
the second will was to uphold at all, it would be by some "other writing." Hodgson's
Estate, 270 Pa. 210, 112 A. 778 (1921) is cited in Forish as giving the requisites for proving
a lost will which are:
(1) the burden rests on the proponent;
(2) two witnesses must prove the contents of the lost will substantially as set forth
in the copy offered for probate;
(3) each witness must be competent as to the execution and contents without aid
from the other.
18. Record at 65a. See Ervisn's Estate, 427 Pa. 64, 233 A.2d 887 (1967), which held that
a conformed but unsigned copy of a lost will can be used to avoid intestacy when the
presumption of revocation could be overcome with evidence which is "positive, clear and
satisfactory." It should be noted that in this case there were no other previous wills existing
which were valid on their face. The use of the above rule is merely to avoid intestacy. See
Foster's Appeal, 87 Pa. 67 (1878); Glockner v. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393, 106 A. 731 (1919).
1967-1968]
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The majority of jurisdictions hold that a lost will containing a clause
of revocation may be established by oral testimony. 9 This is based upon
the theory that the lost will with the revoking clause prevents any prior
will from having force. These jurisdictions require, however, different
degrees and elements of proof in order to establish the lost will as a revok-
ing instrument, but generally these requirements may be divided into
three classes: (1) proof of contents; (2) proof of revoking clause; and
(3) proof of execution.20 California has held that even if the lost will
contains a clause of revocation the contents must be proven.2 This posi-
tion is based upon their Probate Code which states: "No will shall be
proven as a lost will . . . unless its provisions are distinctly and clearly
proved by at least two credible witnesses."22 Contra to California, Min-
nesota holds it sufficient that a later will which is executed containing a
revoking clause be proven. 3 The Alabama Supreme Court has held that
the mere proof of execution was sufficient to operate as revocation of a
first will. 4 Of the three views, Minnesota is the most popular. 5
In Leonard Estate the second will was destroyed and thus it was a
case of pure oral evidence seeking to establish the revocation. The court
adhered strictly to the precedent set in Shetter and Koehler that no oral
evidence was admissible to show revocation of a valid existing will. It is
significant that the court did not restate its Shetter position that a writing
must be produced and signed in accordance with the Wills Act. Distinc-
tions between an original will with the signature obliterated as in Burtt,
an unexecuted copy in Forish, and pure oral evidence in Shetter and
Koehler is obvious in light of the rule's fraud preventive purpose. The
degree to which fraud is mitigated may determine the court's readiness
to admit other written evidence. It is suggested that the rule as to pure
oral testimony be retained as the only effective way of preventing dis-
appointed beneficiaries from contesting wills valid on their face. As to
other instruments such as those in Burtt and Forish either the statutory
mandate should be enforced to the letter, to wit: executed or proved in
the manner required by the Wills Act; or the statutory mandate should
be reformed as to enable a more flexible rule of evidence to establish
revocation.
Robert A. Kelly
19. Driver v. Sheffield, 221 Ga. 316, 85 S.E.2d 766 (1955). Brackenridge v. Roberts,
114 Tex. 418, 270 S.W. 1001 (1925). In re Rokofshy, 111 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1952).
20. 2 W. BowE-D. PARK.ER: PAGE ON WILLS § 21.48 (1960).
21. In re Ruben's Estate, 36 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1964).
22. CAL. PROB. CODE § 350 (West, 1956).
23. In re Cunninghan, 38 Minn. 169, 36 N.W. 269 (1888). Cited with approval in
In re Anthony's Estate, 265 Minn. 369, 121 N.W.2d 772, 778 (1962).
24. Bruce v. Sierra, 175 Ala. 517, 57 So. 709 (1912).
25. Supra note 20, at n.8. Wallis v. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510 (1874). Estate of Laege, 180
Wis. 32, 192 N.W. 373 (1923). Brackenridge v. Roberts, 114 Tex. 418, 270 S.W. 1001 (1925).
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